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bstract
his study investigates the influence of ownership concentration on earnings quality of Brazilian firms. This topic is relevant considering the
ubstantially low number of companies with diffuse ownership structure in Brazil in comparison to US, where most studies about earnings quality
ave been performed. The Brazilian setting permits us to complement Givoly, Hayn, and Katz (2010) analysis between the potential explanations
or the relation between ownership structure and earnings quality based on both the “demand” and “opportunistic behavior” hypothesis. To examine
his relationship, we employ two measures as proxies of earnings quality: earnings persistence and asymmetric timeliness (conservatism). Our
esults are consistent with the “demand” hypothesis and indicate that earnings represent a more consistent indicator of future performance when
wnership structure becomes more dispersed. Our results contribute to the literature because it suggests that the quality of accounting numbers
ave to be assessed considering aspects related to ownership concentration (even when analyzing earnings from public firms). It also contributes
o the investment community because it shows that earnings forecast accuracy may be influenced by ownership structure.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumo
este artigo, teve-se como objetivo investigar a influência da concentrac¸ão acionária sobre a qualidade dos lucros das empresas brasileiras. Este
ópico é relevante ao se considerar o reduzido número de empresas com estrutura propriedade difusa no Brasil em comparac¸ão aos Estados
nidos, onde a maioria dos estudos sobre a qualidade dos lucros foram realizados. O cenário brasileiro nos permite complementar a análise de
ivoly, Hayn e Katz (2010) entre as potenciais explicac¸ões para a relac¸ão entre a estrutura de propriedade e qualidade dos lucros com base tanto
a hipótese da “demanda” quanto na hipótese do “comportamento oportunista”. Para examinar esta relac¸ão, nós empregamos duas medidas como
roxies  da qualidade dos lucros: persistência e antecipac¸ão assimétrica (conservadorismo). Nossos resultados são consistentes com a hipótese
s consistente de desempenho futuro, quando a estrutura de propriedade see “demanda” e indicam que os lucros representam um indicador mai∗ Corresponding author.
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torna mais dispersa. Nossos resultados contribuem para a literatura, porque sugere que a qualidade dos números contábeis tem de ser avaliada
considerando aspectos relacionados à concentrac¸ão de propriedade (mesmo quando analisam os lucros de empresas públicas). Os resultados deste
artigo também contribuem para a comunidade de investimento, porque mostra que a precisão das previsões de lucros pode ser influenciada pela
estrutura de propriedade da empresa analisada.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Qualidade do Lucro; Persistência; Conservadorismo; Concentrac¸ão acionária; Brasil
Resumen
En este estudio se analiza la influencia de la concentración de la propiedad sobre la calidad de los beneficios de las empresas brasilen˜as. Este tema
es relevante cuando se considera el reducido número de empresas que poseen estructura de propiedad difusa en Brasil en comparación con Estados
Unidos, donde se ha llevado a cabo la mayor parte de los estudios sobre la calidad de las ganancias. El escenario brasilen˜o permite aplicar el análisis
de Givoly, Hayn y Katz (2010) entre las posibles explicaciones para la relación de la estructura de propiedad con la calidad de los beneficios, con
base tanto en la hipótesis de la “demanda” como en la del “comportamiento oportunista”. Para examinar dicha relación se emplean dos medidas
como proxies  de calidad de los beneficios: la persistencia y la puntualidad asimétrica (conservadurismo). Los resultados confirman la hipótesis de
“demanda” y sen˜alan que las ganancias representan un indicador más consistente de desempen˜o futuro cuando la estructura de propiedad se hace
más dispersa. Dichos resultados contribuyen a la literatura, ya que sugieren que en la evaluación de la calidad de los números contables deben
tenerse en cuenta los aspectos relacionados con la concentración de la propiedad (incluso cuando se analizan los beneficios de empresas públicas).
Asimismo, contribuyen a la comunidad de inversores, ya que muestran que la precisión de los pronósticos de ganancias puede ser influenciada por
la estructura de propiedad de la empresa.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palabras clave: Calidad de los beneficios; Persistencia; Conservadurismo; Concentración de propiedad; Brasil
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Agency problems essentially arise from the separation of de
acto ownership and control between corporate insiders (e.g.,
ontrolling shareholders) and outsiders (e.g., minority sharehol-
ers). Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) examine the effect of
anagerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism and
nd evidence that conservatism, as measured by the asymmet-
ic timeliness of earnings, declines with managerial ownership.
omplementarily, Givoly, Hayn, and Katz (2010) examine the
ifferential earnings quality of private equity and public equity
rms and find that private equity firms have higher quality accru-
ls and a lower propensity to manage income than public equity
rms, while public equity firms report more conservatively. Our
tudy expands this analysis and examines the effect of share-
older concentration on earnings quality in an environment of
ower investor protection compared to previous studies. Accord-
ng to Durnev and Kim (2005), only Colombia ranks bellow
razil in terms of legal enforcement. Thus we use Brazil to
nvestigate whether there is evidence that earnings quality of
rms listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa)
s influenced by ownership structure.
The ownership structure can play two effects on earnings
uality (Givoly et al., 2010). According to the “demand” hypoth-
sis, firms with stronger demand for quality reporting from
apital providers would present higher earnings quality. Givoly
t al. (2010) argue that earnings of public equity firms have
f higher quality than earnings of private equity firms due
o stronger demand by shareholders and creditors for qual-
ty reporting. On the other hand, the “opportunistic behavior”
t
a
pypothesis says that firms with diffuse ownership structure
hould present lower earnings quality because their managers
ave higher incentives to manipulate earnings.
Our study considers a sample of Brazilian listed firms from
999 to 2014. We consider Brazil as an opportunity to study the
ension between the “demand” and “opportunistic” hypotheses
ecause most Brazilian listed firms have concentrated control,
hich diminishes the importance of external equity funding.
owever, some listed firms do have truly dispersed control,
hich gives us the opportunity to assess how ownership concen-
ration influences earnings quality in a setting of lower investor
rotection.
Thus, we exploit the tension between the “demand” and
opportunistic” hypotheses (Givoly et al., 2010) in an envi-
onment where most public firms have concentraded ownership
nd we observe different levels of earnings quality across firms
Lustosa & Nunes, 2010). We posit that firms will increase earn-
ngs quality when they evaluate that the benefits of reporting
igh-quality numbers exceed the costs, especially when they
eed external equity funding (i.e., they have diffuse control).
hus we consider that the “demand hypothesis” will prevail over
he “opportunistic behavior” one, resulting in better earnings
uality of firms with dispersed control.
According to Dechow and Schrand (2004), high-quality
arnings disclosure has three advantages: it better reflects the
ompany’s operating performance, it is a more accurate indi-
ator of the future performance and it more closely indicates
he intrinsic value of the company. Additionally, Dechow, Ge,
nd Schrand (2010, p. 344) relate that “higher quality earnings
rovide more information about the features of a firm’s financial
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erformance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a
pecific decision-maker.” Thus, earnings presented in the finan-
ial statements must have sufficient reliability so that decision
akers can use the numbers for future projections.
Given the importance of reported earnings, the literature is
oncerned with measuring earnings quality and relates it to
rms’ characteristics. Many researchers have performed empir-
cal studies to test the quality of earnings reported by companies
Da Costa, Lopes, & Costa, 2006). Thus, the perception of
arnings as a measure of financial performance of the com-
any implies the analysis of the level of managers’ influence
n the result presented in the financial statements, which can
eveal conflicts of interest between managers and investors, lead-
ng to the need to establish control mechanisms to govern this
elationship (Dami, Rogers, & Ribeiro, 2009).
Ownership structure is one of the aspects influencing the lee-
ay of managers and corporate governance in general (Silveira,
arros, & Famá, 2008). Fan and Wong (2002) use a sample
f 977 companies in seven East Asian economies and show
hat concentrated ownership and the associated pyramidal and
ross-holding structures create agency conflicts between con-
rolling shareholders and outside investors. Additionally, they
nd positive association between concentrated ownership and
ow earnings informativeness.
However, in Brazil just a handful number of public firms
ave truly dispersed control and we posit that this environment
upport the dominance of the “demand” hypothesis over the
opportunistic behavior” hypothesis because we observe differ-
nt levels of earnings quality across firms (Lustosa & Nunes,
010).
In this context, the present study investigates the following
esearch question: Does  different  ownership  structure  across
ublic ﬁrms  in  a  setting  of  low  investor  protection  inﬂuence
arnings quality  according  to  the  “demand”  hypothesis?
We first analyze the presence of timely loss recognition
conservatism) in Brazilian listed firms while controlling for
wnership concentration. Then we investigate earnings persis-
ence components considering cash flows and accruals, also
ontrolling for ownership concentration.
We consider earnings persistence (Sloan, 1996), and asym-
etric recognition of earnings (Basu, 1997) as proxies for
arnings quality. To estimate the asymmetric timeliness, we con-
ider and adapt the earnings transitory components reversion
odel proposed by Basu (1997). The estimation is performed
onsidering two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to address
he potential endogeneity problem of the ownership concentra-
ion variable. To estimate earnings persistence, we adapt the
odel suggested by Dechow et al. (2010) (Eq. (6)) by adding
he explanatory variable ownership concentration. Our earnings
ersistence models are estimated considering the generalized
ethod of moments (GMM).
Generally our results show there is a significant positive rela-
ionship between timely earnings recognition and ownership
oncentration and a significant inverse relation between earn-
ngs persistence and ownership concentration, indicating that as
he ownership structure becomes more dispersed, the persistence
f profits increases and accounting conservatism decreases. This
e
o
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esult is partially aligned with the predictions of the “demand”
ypothesis considering a low investor protection environment
nd the concentrated ownership structure that prevails in Brazil-
an firms.
La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) find
hat good accounting standards and measures of investor protec-
ion are associated with low ownership concentration, indicating
hat the concentration is in fact a response to weak investor pro-
ection. This situation can lead to incentives for expropriation of
inority shareholders (Silveira, 2006).
Our study extends previous research by focusing on the qual-
ty of the information disclosed in the financial statements,
iming to include the ownership structure as a relevant vari-
ble to explain earnings quality. We believe our results are of
nterest to both the research and the investor communities. First,
ur results suggest that the quality of accounting numbers has to
e assessed and estimated considering aspects related to owner-
hip concentration even within the group of public and/or listed
rms. Second, our results indicate that the accuracy of earnings
orecasts can be influenced by ownership structure, so investors
nd equity analysts should consider this characteristic in their
odels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
Literature review” provides a literature review on ownership
tructure and earnings quality. Section “Methodology” discusses
he empirical methodology, including our sample, the proxies of
arnings quality and develops our hypothesis. Section “Results”
resents the tests and results. Our conclusions are provided in
ection “Conclusions”.
iterature  review
wnership  structure
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership concentra-
ion can be determined by characteristics of the companies or
ectors in which they operate, such as size, risk and regula-
ion. One line of research, developed by La Porta et al. (1998),
ho studied the change in ownership structure of companies
n several countries, suggests that differences in legal systems
nd their effective application cause differences in ownership
tructure. These authors found that countries with common law
ystems provide greater protection to investors than countries
ith code law systems. Thus, countries with weak investor pro-
ection mechanisms develop substitutes for this legal protection,
uch as mandatory dividends and legal reserve requirements (La
orta et al., 1998). In this context, La Porta et al. (1998) state
hat one of the answers to weak investor protection is ownership
oncentration, trying to minimize the likelihood of expropriation
f shareholders by managers.
For Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the presence of controlling
hareholders reduces the possibility that managers will have
ffective control of the company due to the reduced power
f individual shareholders on account of the small ownership
roup. However, according to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), it is
ossible for firms in the same country to have different levels
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f ownership concentration, given the intrinsic characteristics of
he firms or industries.
The Brazilian institutional environment is characterized by
amily businesses (João, Santos, & Filho, 2014; Tres, Serra, &
erreira, 2014), where most firms have concentrated ownership
tructures. This pattern can be explained by the “path depend-
nce” theory (see Bebchuk and Roe (1999)), which argues that
he corporate structure that an economy has at any point in time
epends partially on previous structures the economy had in ear-
ier times. In earlier times the Brazilian economic system was
ased in the colonial system, in which an economy based on
xport of farm commodities by large landholders meant a con-
entrated economic structure of capital and power (Comparato
 Salomão Filho, 2008). Hence, one can argue that family firms
ollowed this “path dependence”, resulting in a concentrated
wnership structure in Brazil. According to Caixe and Krauter
2013), 41% of Brazilian public firms are family controlled
when the founding family or a single investor is the company’s
argest shareholder), 27% have national private ownership (when
 domestic group of investors represents have the majority stake,
xcept for the founding investors or their heirs), and 17.6%
re controlled by pension funds (when a pension fund is the
ompany’s largest shareholder). Segura and Formigoni (2014)
erify the level of debt of Brazilian firms and find that fam-
ly owned firms present lower indebtedness than firms with
ispersed ownership.
According to La Porta et al. (1998), protection of minor-
ty shareholders is important to motivate the dispersion of the
wnership structure. In this sense, the legal environment also
nfluences shareholders’ decisions to dilute their control.
Unlike as suggested by the traditional literature on corporate
overnance, where conflicts permeate the relationship between
anagers and shareholders, in Brazil these conflicts are more
ften between controlling and minority shareholders (Lopes
 Walker, 2008), a consequence of concentrated ownership
tructure, besides the weak institutional environment in Brazil
Anderson, 1999). According to Silveira (2006), studies about
wnership structure usually consider it as a exogenous variable,
hile it should be treated as an endogenous variable. Here we
onsider and treat this issue when we estimate the proposed
odels.
arnings  quality
High ownership concentration may work as a corporate gov-
rnance mechanism in the manager-shareholder relationship.
owever, the presence of large shareholders can influence earn-
ngs quality, since they can pursue private benefits of control at
he expense of other investors, which is called the entrenchment
ffect (Silveira, 2006). According to Dechow et al. (2010), there
re three important characteristics to be observed in relation to
arnings quality:First, earnings quality is conditional on the decision-
relevance of the information. Thus, under our definition, the
term “earnings quality” alone is meaningless; earnings qual-
ity is defined only in the context of a specific decision model.
o
t
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Second, the quality of a reported earnings number depends
on whether it is informative about the firm’s financial per-
formance, many aspects of which are unobservable. Third,
earnings quality is jointly determined by the relevance of
underlying financial performance to the decision and by the
ability of the accounting system to measure performance.
This definition of earnings quality suggests that quality could
be evaluated with respect to any decision that depends on
an informative representation of financial performance. It
does not constrain quality to imply decision usefulness in
the context of equity valuation decisions.
Generally the criteria used to calculate earnings involve
ifferent degrees of discretion applied by senior management
egarding discretionary accruals. In this sense, the ownership
tructure acts as a disciplinary mechanism in the relationship
etween shareholders and managers (Silveira et al., 2008), who
ight use discretionary accruals to manage earnings as an oppor-
unistic way to meet private interests.
According to Givoly et al. (2010), the quality of account-
ng information is influenced by several factors, most of which
tem from the demand for such information. According to the
demand” hypothesis, firms with stronger demand for quality
eporting from capital providers should present higher earnings
uality. That is a characteristic of firms that have higher owner-
hip dispersion (Givoly et al., 2010). On the other hand, the
opportunistic behavior” hypothesis says that firms with dif-
use ownership structure should present lower earnings quality
ecause their managers have stronger incentives to manipulate
arnings. Furthermore, Brazilian institutional environment does
ot incentive firm to report quality earnings (Coelho, Galdi, &
roedel Lopes, 2010).
Finally, Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2012) argue that man-
gers’ actions are not perfectly observable by the owner, and
ecause of that managers have the ability manipulate earnings
o hide unfavorable performance. In this sense, firms with higher
gency costs (i.e., more concentrated ownership structure) are
xpected to have lower earnings quality.
emand  and  opportunistic  behavior  hypothesis  and
arnings quality
Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) argue that timeliness is
efined as the extent to which the current economic outcome
s incorporated by current accounting income and conservatism
s the extent to which current accounting income asymmetrically
ncorporates economic losses and gains considering “bad” and
good” news. As documented by Watts (2003a), conservatism
efers to the cumulative effects represented in the balance sheet
nd income or profits accumulated since the start of operations
f the company. Basu (1997) argues that conservatism means
hat reporting the accounting results reflects “bad news” faster
han “good news”.Watts (2003a) states that conservatism can limit managers’
pportunistic behavior. In a setting with poor investor protec-
ion, concentrated ownership structure is applied as a mechanism
o reduce the probability of expropriation of shareholders by
E.F. Sousa, F.C. Galdi / Revista de Administração 51 (2016) 331–343 335
Hypothesis
Type of  own ership
Public firmsPrivate firms
Private equity,
Private de bt
Private  equity
(concent rated
ownership), Public
debt
Public equity  (diffuse
ownership), Public  de bt
“Demand” H ypo thes is
Low persistence,
Low asymmetric
timeli ness
recog niti on 
Low pers istence, H igh 
asymmetric  timeli ness  
rec ogniti on 
High pers istence,  Low
asymmetric  timeli ness
rec ogniti on
Predicte d quality  of
financial reporting HighMediumLow
“Oppor tun isti c Behavior ”
Hypothesis
High persistence,
Low asymmetric
timeli ness
recog niti on 
Low pers istence, H igh 
asymmetric  timeli ness  
rec ogniti on 
Low  pers iste nce, Low
asymmetric  timeli ness
rec ogniti on
Predicte d quality  of
financial reporting LowMediumHigh
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Source: Adapted fr
anagers (La Porta et al., 1998). Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan
2007) recognize that family firms, compared with nonfamily
rms, face more severe agency problems between controlling
nd non-controlling shareholders. These conflicting effects are
ften referred to as “entrenchment versus alignment”.
In this context, we consider that in line with the “demand”
ypothesis, firms in markets with greater ownership disper-
ion and with greater owner-manager separation (i.e., lower
gency conflicts) have higher probability to report better lev-
ls of earnings quality (Hope et al., 2012), i.e., present high
arnings persistence. Additionally, we expect that firms with
iffuse ownership and public debt should timely recognize both
osses and gains whereas firms with concentrated ownership and
ublic debt should asymmetrically recognize losses, because
ccording to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), timely loss recogni-
ion mitigates the agency problems associated with managers’
nvestment decisions. Incentives between shareholders and cred-
tors are aligned in firms with diffuse ownership and public debt,
ut may be unaligned in firms with concentrated ownership and
ublic debt.
On the other hand, the “opportunistic behavior” hypothe-
is posits that firms with diffuse ownership structure should
resent lower earnings quality (e.g., lower conservatism and
ower earnings persistence) because their managers have higher
ncentives to manipulate earnings considering that outsiders
ave less access to private information and they may benefit
rom earnings management.
According to (Coelho et al., 2010), the Brazilian institutional
nvironment does not encourage firms to report quality earnings,
lthough the need for funding may induce firms to improve their
eporting system. The empirical evidence shows that the degree
f accounting conservatism differs across countries and accord-
ng to preparers’ incentives (Chi & Wang, 2010). In this context,
ig. 1 presents our expectations regarding the earnings quality
roxy behavior used in this study, considering both the demand
nd opportunistic behavior hypotheses discussed in Givoly et al.
2010).
Hence we posit that Brazilian listed firms with higher
wnership concentration and public debt present more timely
oss recognition (TLR) in comparison to firms with dispersed
oncentration because debtholders demand TLR to inhibit
e
a
p
gd quality of financial reporting.
ivoly et al. (2010).
anagers’ natural optimism. Additionally, we consider that
isted firms with dispersed ownership report with neutrality,
resenting lower TLR, since the major agency conflicts in the
razilian market arise between the controlling shareholders and
inority shareholders (Lopes & Walker, 2008) and the latter
ave preference for firms with high payout ratios. Gonzaga and
osta (2009) find evidence that dividend payments are nega-
ively related to conservatism.
Da Costa et al. (2006) argue that excessive conservatism can
ead to disclosure of information with false signals to users.
enman and Zhang (2002) empirically diagnosed low quality
f earnings resulting from the variation in investments with
ccounting conservatism, arguing that accounting conservatism
aises questions about the quality of accounting information
nd profit. The reason is that with growth in investment, pro-
ts are reduced by creating hidden reserves. These reserves
an be reduced, generating profits, arising from the reduction
f investments or reducing their growth rate.
On the other hand, Watts (2003b) shows that accounting con-
ervatism is related to the contractual relationship between the
ompany and creditors, with the intention of ensuring com-
liance with contractual covenants. Thus, conservatism can be
onsidered an efficient mechanism for determining the param-
ters of contracts (Paulo, Antunes, & Formigoni, 2008), as it
elps to reduce the opportunistic behavior of managers (Watts,
003b).
Following the arguments that excessive conservatism in earn-
ngs reporting provides poor information to the capital markets,
ypothesis H1 is:
1.  According to the “demand” hypothesis, public firms with
oncentrated ownership present higher conservatism than those
ith diffuse ownership structure.
Earnings persistence is generally considered to be an impor-
ant feature of accounting quality because it enables more
ccurate forecasts. According to Lipe (1990), earnings persis-
ence is the degree to which unexpected changes in current period
arnings affect the next period earnings. Dechow et al. (2010)
rgue that research on earnings persistence that considers it as a
roxy for earnings quality is motivated by the assumption that
reater persistence and sustainability of earnings are taken as the
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est indicator of future cash flows and therefore provide the most
seful information for valuation models. Richardson, Sloan,
oliman, and Tuna (2005) comment that empirical findings gen-
rally confirm that less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings
ersistence, in turn leading to significant security mispricing.
dditionally, Sloan (1996) argues that persistence depends both
n the accounting measurement system and firms’ performance,
nd disentangling the role of each is not an easy task.
According to Pimentel and Aguiar (2012), earnings persis-
ence has an important role to predict firm value, so it is a
esirable quality of earnings. However, in the Brazilian capital
arket few studies have analyzed the importance of earnings
ersistence. Pimentel and Aguiar (2016) analyze the role of
arnings persistence in valuation accuracy and as a proxy for
ong-term market orientation in the Brazilian market. They find
 negative relationship between earnings persistence and valua-
ion errors, indicating that firms with higher persistence provide
ore accurate value estimates than firms with low persistence.
Additionally, Pimentel and Aguiar (2012) analyze quarterly
arnings persistence and its relationship between the corporate
overnance standards and firm size. They find that firm size
eems to be an important determinant of earnings persistence
nd that earnings persistence is different for firms with differ-
nt corporate governance standards. Coelho, Aguiar, and Lopes
2011) analyze the relationship between earnings persistence,
ndustry structure and market share and find that the combined
ffect of industry structure and market share does not guarantee
bnormal future earnings.
The “demand hypothesis” (Givoly et al., 2010) considers that
ublic firms with public debt and public equity present strong
emand for quality external reporting from both equity and debt
olders. We consider that public firms with diffuse ownership
ontrol operating in a lower investor protection environment like
razil have incentives to report earnings that accurately predict
uture performance. Thus, our second hypothesis is:
2.  According to the “demand” hypothesis, public firms,
esearchers have shown that profits produce smaller forecasting
rrors than the cash flow valuation models: since profits are more
trongly associated with stock returns than cash flow, profits are
ore persistent than cash flow and are less volatile than the cash
ow component. Thus accruals can provide useful information,
espite the fact they are less persistent.
In this sense we adopt the definition of earnings quality pre-
ented in Dechow et al. (2010), in which quality of profit exists
nly if it is informative about firm’s performance, and we for-
ulate our second hypothesis:
0(ii). Firms with dispersed control present higher persistence
f future earnings relative to current earnings.
ethodologyata
Our sample comprises companies listed on the São Paulo
tock Exchange (BM&FBovespa), covering the period from
a
m
t
tministração 51 (2016) 331–343
999 to 2014. Accounting and market data were obtained from
he Economatica database.
We excluded from the sample financial services and insurance
rms, due to their specific accounting rules. Additionally, we
xcluded firms that did not present information about ownership
oncentration consistently throughout the period.
Thus, we kept in the sample the companies that presented
nformation about ownership concentration for at least six years.
To mitigate the effects of extreme observations (outliers) in
he econometric models, we winsorized the following variables
t 2.5%: operating profit, operating cash flow, total accruals,
arnings per share, and return.
Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), our measure of con-
entration (ConcA1) is given by the percentage of shares owned
y the largest shareholder. To expand the concept of concen-
ration, we also used the percentage of shares owned by the
ve largest shareholders (ConcA5). This is because managers
ften hold shares. Therefore, the fraction of shares owned by
he largest shareholder is not a reliable measure of the degree
f investor protection. However, managers typically do not own
nough shares to be counted among the five largest shareholders
Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
Thus, both measures were calculated as:
og
(
percentage concentration
100 −  percentage concentration
)
ndogeneity  problem
The econometric models applied in this study use as an
xplanatory variable of the quality of earnings that assume
wnership concentration is a variable exogenous to the model.
owever, there is a possibility that the variable is endoge-
ous (correlated with the error term, cov(xj, u)(xj, u) /=  0
Wooldridge, 2006)) compared to net income, i.e., a particular
wnership structure may result in profit disclosure with high
uality. However, the earnings disclosure quality can attract
nvestors to the company and modify the ownership concen-
ration.
As documented by Silveira (2006), previous authors have
laimed that the type of occurrence mentioned results from
he phenomenon of reverse causality, which is to incorrectly
nterpret the effect as being the cause.
The more recent literature has shown that ownership structure
s an endogenous variable (Cho, 1998; Demsetz & Villalonga,
001; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999). For instance,
immelberg et al. (1999), following Demsetz and Lehn (1985),
nvestigated evidence that the ownership structure is determined
y endogenous variables like size, economic sector and other
erformance variables. They found that ownership concentration
s explained by variables linked the firm characteristics.
Wooldridge (2006) argues that if one estimates the regression
odel by least squares in the presence of endogeneity, biasednd inconsistent estimators are obtained for the parameter of the
odel. To solve this problem, the author suggests the estima-
ion by two-stage least squares (2SLS), where in the first stage
he endogenous variable is regressed in terms of the instrumental
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ariables, generating an array of fitted values for each regression,
nd in the second stage the model is estimated for the depend-
nt variable on the basis of estimated values of the explanatory
ariables.
symmetric  timeliness  model
To estimate the indicators of conservatism, we started with the
odel of reversal of transitory components in earnings proposed
y Basu (1997):
Earnit
Pt−1
=  β0 +  β1Dit +  β2REit +  β3Dit REit +  εit (1)
here Earnit denotes earnings per share of firm i  in period t,
it is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the economic
eturn is negative and “0” if positive, REit is the economic return
f firm i in period t (the economic return is given by Pt −  Pt−1)
nd Pt−1 is the share price at the end of last year.
In Eq. (1), the coefficients β1 and β3 capture the asymmetric
ecognition of economic return by accounting profit (conser-
atism), while the coefficient β2 captures the timely recognition
f economic return in book income stream, in other words, it
eflects the timeliness of accounting income.
According to Basu (1997), β3 is positive and significant statis-
ically if “bad news” is recognized in profit before “good news”,
ndicating the presence of conservatism. Finally, the dummy
ariable Dit is used to test the higher sensitivity of net income
ccounting to negative returns than to positive ones.
If a negative economic return is incorporated more signif-
cantly by the accounting profit than a positive return, this
ndicates the existence of conservatism in recognizing economic
eturn, so that β3 will be larger and more statistically significant
han β2 (Da Costa et al., 2006).
In Eq. (1), referring to the model of Basu (1997), β3 is positive
nd significant statistically if “bad news” is recognized in profits
efore “good news”, indicating the presence of conservatism.
inally, the dummy variable ConcA1 ∗  CFO  is used to test the
igher sensitivity of net income accounting to negative returns
han to positive ones.
If a negative economic return is incorporated more signif-
cantly by the accounting profit than a positive return, this
ndicates the existence of conservatism in recognizing economic
eturn, so that β3 will be larger and more statistically significant
han β2 (Da Costa et al., 2006).
In Eq. (1), referring to the model of Basu (1997), we added
he variable ownership concentration ConcAk i,t we added the
ariable ownership concentration ConcAk i,t , where “k” is the
ndex denotes if the concentration is measured by the percent-
ge of shares owned by the largest shareholder (k  = 1) or by
he percentage of shares owned by the five largest shareholders
k = 5).
The estimation was performed using the two-stage least
quares (2SLS) model to resolve the problem of endogeneity
f the ownership concentration variable. The endogene-
ty test was performed to test the significance of the
oefficients, and the results showed evidence of the existence of
w
yministração 51 (2016) 331–343 337
ndogeneity at 1%.
Earnit
Pt−1
=  (β11 +  ui) + β12Dit +  β13REit +  β14Dit REit
+  β15ConcAKit +  β16(ConcAKit ∗ REit)
+ β17(ConcAKit ∗  Dit REit) +  β18 Log(Assetit) + εi
oncAKit =  β21 +  β22 Log(Assetit) +  β23ADRt +  β24Dit
+  β25REit +  β26Dit REit +
10∑
j=1
δjYear  +  ε2 (2)
As an instrument of ownership concentration variable, we
sed the logarithm of assets Log(Asset) as a measure of com-
any size. According to Himmelberg et al. (1999), larger com-
anies’ shareholders can be better protected by more dispersed
oncentration. However, large companies can also experience
ore severe agency conflicts due to dispersed ownership.
Also we used the variable “ADR”, which indicates whether
he firm has American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), in order to
dentify the impact of changes in the regulation of ownership
oncentration. We also included a dummy variable, YEAR, to
apture the macroeconomic effects of the period.
In the model presented in Eq. (5), the coefficient CFO  cap-
ures the relationship of profit with the company’s ownership
oncentration. Our main interest in Eq. (2) is to identify if
17 >  0 and β17 >  β14 · β16 <  β17. If β17 >  0 and β17 >  β14,
16 <  β17 there is evidence that in the presence of higher owner-
hip concentration, negative economic returns have higher
ssociation with earnings, which is expected considering our H1.
arnings  persistence  model
Based on the model suggested by Sloan (1996) and Dechow
t al. (2010) (Eq. (6)), and its formulation decomposing income
nto its components operating cash flow and accruals (Eq. (7)),
e added the explanatory variable of the study, the shareholding
oncentration:
arnt+1 =  α  +  β1Earnt +  εt+1 (3)
arnt+1 =  α  +  β1Acct +  β2FCOt +  εt+1 (4)
In these equations, “Earn” is defined as operating income
caled by total assets (Sloan, 1996). Thus, according to the
uthor, β  in Eq. (6) measures the persistence of the rate of
eturn on assets. In Eq. (7), β1 < β2, which implies lower profit
ersistence is attributed to the total accrual component.
As a first step, we estimated the persistence of future earnings
elative to current earnings in the format below:
arnt+1 =  α +  β1Earnt + β2ConcAKt
+  β3(ConcAKt ∗  Earnt) +  εt+1 (5)
here Earnt+1 is earnings in year t + 1; Earnt is earnings in
ear t, and the variable ownership concentration is controlled by
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oncAkt , where “k” represents the index denoting if the concen-
ration is measured by the percentage of shares owned by the
argest shareholder (k  = 1) or by the percentage of shares owned
y the five largest shareholders (k  = 5).
In Eq. (5), the coefficient β3 captures the relationship of profit
ith the company’s ownership concentration, i.e., the variation
f the profit goes through the ownership concentration. The
oefficient β2 indicates whether there is any statistically signif-
cant relationship between the independent variables ownership
oncentration and accounting profit.
Following the method proposed by Sloan (1996), we decom-
osed the profit into its components and added the variable
wnership concentration:
arnt+1 =  β0 +  β1Acct +  β2FCOt +  β3ConcAKt
+  β4(ConcAKt ∗  Acct)
+ β5(ConcAKt ∗ FCOt) +  εt+1 (6)
To determine the values of the variable accruals, we followed
loan (1996), who states that the total accruals can be calculated
sing information from the balance sheet and income statement:
cc  =  (CA  −  cash) −  (CL  −  STD  −  TP) −  Dep
(7)
here CA  is the change in current assets; Cash  is the change
n cash and cash equivalents; CL  is the change in current
iabilities; STD  is the change in debt included in current lia-
ilities; TP  is the change in income taxes payable and Dep  is
epreciation and amortization.Prior to 2007, the cash flow was calculated by the difference
f net income and accruals using the indirect method, as com-
ented by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995). For periods
nding after 2007(when disclosure of a cash flow statement
m
t
(
D
able 1
escriptive statistics.
ariables Mean Stan
perating income 0.005 0.10
otal accruals −0.002 0.11
perating cash flow 0.048 0.07
wnership concentration by the largest shareholder 0.169 0.66
wnership concentration by the five largest shareholder 0.670 0.78
arnings per shares 0.755 4.81
eturn 0.210 0.81
ource: authors.
ariables:
perating income – is earnings in year t, scaled by total assets.
otal accruals – is the total accruals can be calculated using information from the b
TP) − Dep. CA is the change in current assets; Cash is the change in cash and 
n debt included in current liabilities; TP is the change in income taxes payable and
perating cash ﬂow – is the cash flow, calculated by the difference of net income and
wnership concentration by the largest shareholder – is ownership concentration me
wnership concentration by the ﬁve largest shareholder – is ownership concentration
arnings per shares – denotes earnings per share of firm i in period t, scaled by price
eturn – is the economic return of firm i in period t (the economic return is given by ministração 51 (2016) 331–343
tarted to be mandatory in Brazil) we collected this information
onsidering the direct method, i.e., directly from the cash flow
tatement. All the information was collect from Economatica
atabase.
To estimate earnings persistence coefficients, we used a
ynamic panel model, which can pose some estimation prob-
ems. For our purposes, these are the presence of the lagged
ependent variable as an explanatory variable, causing prob-
ems of autocorrelation, and the grouping of the panel data
n a shorter time scale (smallT) and a larger number of firms
large N).
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed estimators to solve
anel models for smallT and large N, which consists of the
se of the generalized method of moments (GMM). Instead
f this estimator, we employed an equivalent estimator, that
f Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond, which leads to an addi-
ional hypothesis, that the first difference of the instruments
s not correlated with the fixed effects, which increase the
umber of instruments and increases efficiency, allowing cor-
ection of the estimation bias caused by the lagged variable,
nd accepts variables that are not strictly exogenous, mean-
ng accepting a certain degree of endogeneity and correcting
t.
As documented by Dechow et al. (2010), more persistent
rofits causes higher stock values, so increase in the estimate
f persistence is associated with positive returns in the capital
arket.
esults
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. We observe that the
ean of ownership concentration suggests that ownership struc-
ure is highly concentrated in Brazil, as found in prior studies
Black, De Carvalho, & Sampaio, 2014; Coelho et al., 2010;
almácio & Corrar, 2007). The mean of the return is 0.210,
dard deviation Lower quartile Median Upper quartile
9 0.000 0.000 0.059
1 −0.053 −0.003 0.052
2 0.000 0.000 0.100
9 −0.115 0.000 0.274
4 0.000 0.447 1.143
8 −0.002 0.137 1.044
1 −0.266 0.052 0.481
alance sheet income statement: TA = (CA − Cash) − (CL − STD −
cash equivalents; CL is the change in current liabilities; STD is the change
 Dep is depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets.
 accruals, scaled by total assets.
asured by the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder.
 measured by the percentage of shares owned by the five largest shareholders.
 in period t − 1.
[Pt − Pt−1]/Pt−1).
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Table 2
Regression to asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition.
Variables Pred.
Sign
% of shares held by the largest shareholder % of shares held by the five largest shareholders
Coeff. Est. z-stat. Coeff. Est. z-stat.
Panel A – Total Sample
Cons −1.498*** −4.44 −5.081*** −3.67
Dit − −0.538 −1.36 −0.755** −2.14
RE + 0.374 1.58 1.738*** 2.98
Dit ∗ RE − −2.966*** −3.46 −8.209*** −3.57
ConcA1 + 14.225*** 4.78 – –
ConcA1 ∗ RE + −4.210*** −4.20 – –
ConcA1 ∗ Dit ∗ RE ? 15.566*** 4.59 – –
ConcA5 + – – 7.322*** 3.46
ConcA5 ∗ RE + – – −2.371*** −2.88
ConcA5 ∗ Dit ∗ RE ? – – 9.153*** 3.24
Log(Asset)t − −0.052*** −4.34 −0.036** −2.35
No. Obs. 2.593
Panel B – Small Companies
Cons −1.181* −1.90 −2.135 −0.88
Dit − −1.442** −2.16 −1.485** −2.12
RE + −0.321 −0.85 −0.563 −0.62
Dit ∗ RE −  −2.671** −2.11 −3.245 −0.87
ConcA1 + 2.339 0.63 – −
ConcA1 ∗ RE + 0.061 0.06 – −
ConcA1 ∗ Dit ∗ RE ? 2.392 0.58 – −
ConcA5 + – – 1.747 0.51
ConcA5 ∗ RE + – – 0.593 0.52
ConcA5 ∗ Dit ∗ RE ? – – 0.770 0.19
Log(Asset)t − −0.026 −1.32 −0.011 −0.51
No. Obs. 829
Panel C – Big Companies
Cons −1.350*** −3.42 −6.499*** −4.77
Dit − 0.075 0.13 −0.112 −0.26
RE + 0.562* 1.65 3.016*** 4.70
Dit ∗ RE − −1.993 −1.58 −10.103*** −4.18
ConcA1 + 22.280*** 6.02 – –
ConcA1 ∗ RE + −8.180*** −5.53 – –
ConcA1 ∗ Dit ∗ RE ? 25.471*** 5.68 – –
ConcA5 + – – 10.332*** 4.80
ConcA5 ∗ RE + – – −4.332*** −4.58
ConcA5 ∗ Dit ∗ RE ? – – 14.795*** 4.64
Log(Asset)t − −0.085*** −5.41 −0.075*** −3.49
No. Obs. 1.764
Earnit/Pt−1 = (β11 + ui) + β12Dit + β13REit + β14DitREit + β15ConcAKit + β16(ConcAKit ∗ REit) + β17(ConcAKit ∗ DitREit) + β18 Log(Assetit) + εit
ConcAKit = β21 + β22Log(Assetit) + β23ADRt + β24Dit + β25REit + β26DitREit +
10∑
j=1
δjYear + ε2
Variables: Earnit denotes earnings per share of firm i in period t, Dit is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the economic return is negative and “0” if positive,
REit is the economic return of firm i in period t (the economic return is given by [Pt − Pt−1]/Pt−1) and Pt−1 is the share price at the end of last year, ConcAki,t , is
ownership concentration where “k” is the index that tells if the concentration is measured by the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder (k = 1) or by
the percentage of shares owned by the five largest shareholders (k = 5), Log(Asset) is the logarithm of total assets as a measure of company size.
*
s
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i* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
** Significance at 1%.
imilar to that found by Da Costa et al. (2006), as well as the
ean of the operating income.
symmetric  timeliness  and  timely  loss  recognitionTable 2 shows the results estimated by the regression model
f Basu (1997), as modified by insertion of our explanatory
ariable, ownership concentration.
(
b
hResults in Table 2 indicate that firms with concentrated
wnership recognize more asymmetrically their gains and
osses. Table 2, panel A, shows a positive β15, indicating that
ompany ownership concentration relates positively with earn-
ng in Brazil. The main coefficient of our analysis is β17 ×
ConcAn ∗  Dit ∗  RE). β17 is positive and significant and also
igger than β14, showing evidence that in the presence of
igher ownership concentration, negative economic returns have
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igher association with earnings, what is expected considering
ur H1.
Regarding the relationship with ownership concentration, the
esults are similar for both the concentration measured as a per-
entage of shares owned by the largest shareholder ConcA1 and
he percentage of shares owned by the five largest sharehol-
ers ConcA5. For both measures, the coefficients have values
tatistically significant at 1%.
The results show that as the ownership structure becomes
ore concentrated, there tends to be greater conservatism.
ccording to the literature, this indicates the possibility of pro-
iding less reliable information to the market with regard to
rofit as an effective indicator for predicting future earnings
Penman & Zhang, 2002).
This may stem from the fact that conservatism acts as a
echanism to mitigate agency conflicts between minority share-
olders and controlling shareholders (Ahmed, Billings, Morton,
 Stanford-Harris, 2002). Although documented by Gonzaga
nd Costa (2009), when agency conflicts are more intense, the
emand for conservatism may increase due to the need for align-
ent of interests between these groups of shareholders.
According to the “demand” hypothesis, public firms with
oncentrated ownership present higher conservatism than those
ith diffuse ownership structure. According to the “opportunis-
ic behavior” hypothesis, managers have higher incentives to
anipulate earnings when the firms have diffuse ownership
h
w
c
able 3
egression of earnings persistence.
ariables Pred.
Sign
% of shares held by the largest shar
Est. Coeff. t-stat. 
anel A – Total Sample
Earn + 0.532*** 51.97 
ConcA1 − −153.499*** −4.67 
ConcA5 − – – 
ConcA1 ∗ Earn − −0.039*** −6.26 
ConcA5 ∗ Earn − – – 
No. Obs. 3.671
anel B – Small Companies
Earn + 0.887*** 3.53 
ConcA1 − −195.526*** −11.48 
ConcA5 − – – 
ConcA1 ∗ Earn − −0.243* −1.92 
ConcA5 ∗ Earn − – – 
No. Obs. 1.494
anel C – Big Companies
Earn + −0.074*** −35.69 
ConcA1 − −3.383*** −41.63 
ConcA5 − – – 
ConcA1 ∗ Earn − 0.035*** 35.51 
ConcA5 ∗ Earn − – – 
No. Obs. 2.177
arnt+1 = α + β1Earnt + β2ConcAKt + β3(ConcAKt ∗ Earnt) + εt+1
ariables: Earnt+1 is earnings in year t + 1; Earnt is earnings in year t, and the variab
oncentration is measured by the percentage of shares owned by the largest sharehold
k = 5).
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 1%.ministração 51 (2016) 331–343
tructure (Givoly et al., 2010). Thus, conservatism arises as
n efficient mechanism to control the parameters of contracts
Paulo et al., 2008), and to reduce the opportunistic behavior of
anagers (Watts, 2003b).
We complement our analysis by clustering the model by firm
ize. We split our sample into big firms and small firms consid-
ring “big” firms the ones that are above the median of the size,
easure by total assets, and “small” firms that are below the
edian. Thus, we found that the big firms are more sensitive to
he ownership structure. Using measures of ownership concen-
ration as largest shareholder and the five largest shareholders,
e found that in bigger companies as the ownership structure
ecomes more concentrated, the presence of accounting conser-
atism is stronger. The presence of conservatism for this group
s higher than when analyzing the sample with all firms.
The results show that for larger companies there was no
ccounting conservatism in the sample. However, the ownership
oncentration is statistically significant only for larger compa-
ies. We believe that this result stems from the fact that big firms
end to have ownership structures strongly concentrated in fam-
ly hands, which implies lower information asymmetry (Easley,
vidkjaer, & O’hara, 2002).
Considering the results for the Brazilian capital market,ypothesis H1 is not rejected, according to which companies
ith dispersed control and/or only common shares tend to be less
onservative than those with concentrated ownership structure.
eholder % of shares held by the five largest shareholders
Est. Coeff. t-stat.
0.514*** 86.50
– –
−91.273*** −7.17
– –
−0.026*** −9.35
1.599 0.31
– –
−179.162*** −5.02
– –
−0.597 −0.23
−0.075*** −109.17
– –
21.931*** 8.85
– –
0.049*** 30.08
le ownership concentration is controlled by ConcAkt , where “k” denotes if the
er (k = 1) or by the percentage of shares owned by the five largest shareholders
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The results show the coefficient β17 is higher than β14, for
oth the total sample and the sample of big companies, indicating
hat concentrated ownership firms recognize losses asymmetri-
ally in relation to dispersed firms (i.e., concentrated firms are
ore conservative). In other words, this result shows that con-
entrated firms present higher association between economic
eturn and earnings when returns are negative. This result is
obust for the two different measures of ownership concentration
e consider in our estimation.
arnings  persistenceThe empirical tests for the persistence of earnings are pre-
ented in Table 3, which shows the regression results of Eq. (5),
nvestigating the performance of future earnings in current earn-
ngs. Consistent with the findings of Sloan (1996), our sample
t
(
v
able 4
egression of the earnings persistence considering the decomposition into cash flow 
ariables Pred.
Sign
% of shares held by the largest shareho
Est. Coeff. t-stat. 
anel A – Total Sample
Acc + 155.987*** 7.22 
CFO + 244.497** 2.07 
ConcA1 – −38.782*** −2.65 
ConcA5 – – – 
ConcA1 ∗ Acc – 325.209*** 4.12 
ConcA1 ∗ CFO – 1353.367*** −4.64 
ConcA5 ∗ Acc – – – 
ConcA5 ∗ CFO – – – 
No. Obs. 3.671
anel B – Small Companies
Acc + 141.291** 2.49 
CFO + 583.869 1.14 
ConcA1 – −120.291** −2.30 
ConcA5 – – – 
ConcA1 ∗ Acc – 642.492*** 2.74 
ConcA1 ∗ CFO – 3969.205*** 4.03 
ConcA5 ∗ Acc – – – 
ConcA5 ∗ CFO – – – 
No. Obs. 1.494
anel C – Big Companies
Acc + 236.091*** 9.66 
CFO + 180.124*** 7.71 
ConcA1 – −5.128 −0.86 
ConcA5 – – – 
ConcA1 ∗ Acc – −56.678** −2.07 
ConcA1 ∗ CFO – 3.246 0.09 
ConcA5 ∗ Acc – – – 
ConcA5 ∗ CFO – – – 
No. Obs. 2.177
arnt+1 = β0 + β1Acct + β2FCOt + β3ConcAKt + β4(ConcAKt ∗ Acct) + β5(Con
ariables: Earnt+1 is earnings in year t + 1; Acc is the total accruals can be calcu
CA − ΔCash) − (CL − STD − TP) − Dep. CA is the change in current a
urrent liabilities; STD is the change in debt included in current liabilities; TP is 
FO cash flow was calculated by the difference of net income and accruals, and the v
he concentration is measured by the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareho
k = 5)
** Significance at 5%.
** Significance at 1%.ministração 51 (2016) 331–343 341
hows a positive relationship between future and current profit,
ith coefficients equal to 0.532 and 0.514 for the two measures
f ownership concentration respectively. Both are significant
t the 1% level, thus indicating persistence and sustainability
f earnings, so that their performance is not merely transitory,
howing that this profit is a good indicator for valuation models.
The results seem to corroborate the findings of Pimentel and
guiar (2012) in analyzing the earnings persistence consider-
ng its relationship with firm size in the Brazilian market. Our
ndings suggest that the size can be an important determinant
f earnings persistence. In this sense, this result shows that in
he Brazilian setting, earnings persistence may increase valua-
ion accuracy and thus be more important in valuation decisions
Coelho et al., 2011; Pimentel & Aguiar, 2012, 2016).
The results of the estimators for the ownership concentration
ariable showed the expected signs and a negative relationship
and accruals.
lder % of shares held by the five largest shareholders
Est. Coeff. t-stat.
8.787 0.07
19.975 0.11
– –
−36.768*** −2.60
– –
– –
256.009** 2.02
602.384*** 4.33
−76.436 −1.63
295.119 0.65
– –
−92.090** −2.03
– –
– –
620.124*** 6.66
1965.147*** 4.21
344.998*** 8.84
256.439*** 7.13
– –
10.360*** 2.88
– –
– –
−274.699*** −8.00
−143.088*** −5.53
cAKt ∗ FCOt) + εt+1
lated using information from the balance sheet and income statement: TA =
ssets; Cash is the change in cash and cash equivalents; CL is the change in
the change in income taxes payable and Dep is depreciation and amortization.
ariable ownership concentration is controlled by ConcAkt , where “k” denotes if
lder (k = 1) or by the percentage of shares owned by the five largest shareholders
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ith respect to future earnings, indicating that the higher the
wnership concentration, the lower the persistence and sustaina-
ility of future profits.
Our results also show that when we split the sample into
ig firms and small firms, the persistence of future earnings in
urrent earnings is stronger for small firms than for big firms,
pecifically for the group of the shares owned by the largest
hareholder.
To enlarge the perception of this relationship, Table 4 presents
he estimated results for regression 9, applying the decomposi-
ion of earnings as suggested by Sloan (1996). Like the results
f Sloan (1996), our sample showed that the performance gain is
ore persistent than the cash flow component for the Brazilian
apital market.
The ownership concentration is significant at a level of 1% for
he both measures of ownership concentration, the percentage
f shares owned by the largest shareholder and the percentage
f shares owned by the five largest shareholders.
The results indicate, as in the previous model, a significant
nd negative relation with the performance of future earnings,
einforcing the evidence that the greater the ownership concen-
ration, the lower the persistence of earnings.
When analyzing the relationship of ownership concentration
ith the persistence of accruals in earnings, it is statistically
ignificant for both the largest shareholder as for the five largest
hareholders, as is the relationship of ownership concentration
ith operating cash flow, significant at 1%. However, just for the
ve largest shareholders, in the sample of the larger companies,
he relation is negative, indicating that as the ownership structure
ecomes more concentrated, the cash flow generation tends to
ecrease.
Based on the results presented, the earnings persistence is dif-
erent for firms with different ownership concentration and the
rm size influences the effect of ownership structure in the earn-
ngs persistence. In this context, we conclude that the findings
o not reject hypothesis H2, according to which firms with dis-
ersed control have higher persistence of future earnings relative
o current earnings in the Brazilian capital market.
onclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the existence of a relationship
etween the ownership structure (ownership concentration) and
arnings quality in Brazil, where most firms have high owner-
hip concentration. We posit that this environment supports the
demand” hypothesis instead of the “opportunistic behavior”
ypothesis. To measure earnings quality, we use as proxies con-
ervatism and earnings persistence.
Our results indicate that accounting conservatism grows
s the ownership structure becomes more concentrated. The
revious literature highlights the importance of understanding
ccounting conservatism in financial reporting, as this influ-
nces the economic and financial analysis of companies. Since,
he Brazilian institutional environment favors weak protection
f minority investors, conservatism may be a response to this
ituation.
Aministração 51 (2016) 331–343
Thus, the minority shareholders may demand greater effi-
iency in contractual relations, where conservatism can act to
educe the opportunistic behavior regarding the financial infor-
ation taken as a basis for contracts. In the context of this study,
s much of the literature emphasizes, conservatism can lead to
iased market information.
Regarding the measure of persistence, our results show that as
he ownership structure becomes more concentrated, persistence
f profit and hence its sustainability become less persistent, so
he profit shown in these conditions does not provide reliable
nformation for valuation processes.
When we decompose the current earnings into its components
perating cash flow and accruals, the results indicate that the per-
istence of profit is higher in the cash flow component and shows
hat as the ownership structure becomes more concentrated with
ess persistence of profit.
Previous research has shown that persistence is important in
ts economic aspects, as evidenced by the level of sustainability
f profits, and therefore can strongly impact returns.
Our results contribute to academia because they suggest that
he quality of accounting numbers has to be assessed considering
spects related to ownership concentration (even when analyzing
arnings of public firms). They also contribute to the investment
ommunity by showing that earnings forecast accuracy may be
nfluenced by ownership structure.
It is important to note that our study does not explicitly
apture the presence and relevance of institutional investors.
nother limitation of our study is in the small participation of
rms with dispersed ownership in the sample. This is an inherent
imitation due to the ownership pattern in Brazil.
The low variability of the sample in relation to dispersed firms
otentially leads to increase in the variance of coefficients. In this
ense, it is important to mention that the results of the separate
ub-samples of small and big firms may have been influenced
y the low variability of the explanatory variable ownership
oncentration.
Finally, regarding future research, we recommend analyzing
he influence of ownership concentration on financial reporting
uality using additional metrics, as presented by Dechow et al.
2010).
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